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SAJN V. CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT: PROVIDING SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR 
STUDENT-ATHLETES? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Long ago, legal scholars held a funeral service for the tort of 
educational malpractice. From time to time, academics exhume 
the tort in law review articles for a post-mortem analysis of 
what courts view as its fatal flaws and to beat their chests in 
collective lamentation. Despite this, it is universally accepted 
that to use the term "educational malpractice" in a cause of ac-
tion is to doom it to dismissal. That is why it was an enormous 
surprise when the Iowa Supreme Court, in April of 2001, 
breathed new life into the defunct tort by denying the defen-
dant Cedar Rapids Community School District's motion for 
summary judgment. 1 In that case, a student sued the school 
district for negligent misrepresentation by a school guidance 
counselor. 2 The Iowa Supreme Court's holding was only the 
second time in educational malpractice's thirty-year life span 
where the claim emerged victorious from the jaws of summary 
judgment. One explanation for this unusual holding is that the 
court was trying to protect a category of persons considered es-
pecially vulnerable to exploitation: student-athletes. 
This case note will analyze the Sain holding, beginning in 
Section II by reciting the facts of Sain. Section III will examine 
the judiciary's overwhelmingly adverse response to claims of 
educational malpractice. Sain will be contrasted with Brown v. 
Compton Unified School District, 3 having almost the same facts 
but the opposite outcome to show how this case would ordinar-
ily be decided. Section IV will examine the rationale the Sain 
court used to uphold the negligent misrepresentation claim. 
Section V will explore the possibility that Sain received differ-
1. Sain u. Cedar Rapid Community Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 2001). 
2. ld. at 120. 
3. 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171 (App. 2d Dist. 1998). 
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ent treatment because he is a student-athlete. Section VI will 
discuss the constitutional arguments that could bolster judicial 
recognition of a special relationship between student-athletes 
and educational institutions. Section VII will discuss possible 
impediments to recognizing a special student-athlete/school re-
lationship and also discuss how Sain could serve as precedent 
for special protection of student-athletes. 
II. THE FACTS 
The plaintiff, Bruce Sain, was a student at Jefferson High 
School in the defendant school district. 4 He was an unusually 
gifted basketball player who planned on using a basketball 
scholarship to finance his college education. In order to be eli-
gible to play college basketball, he had to satisfy the NCAA's 
high school course requirements. Sain had already satisfied 
many of the NCAA's requirements by his senior year, but with 
three trimesters left, he still needed to take three approved 
English courses. He completed one approved class his first tri-
mester but disliked the course in which he was enrolled the 
second trimester. He met with Bowen, the school guidance 
counselor, who was generally familiar with the NCAA's re-
quirements, to try to find a substitute class. Bowen suggested 
that Sain take a brand new course called "Technical Communi-
cations" and assured Sain that the NCAA clearinghouse would 
5 
approve the course. 
The school, however, did not include the course on the list of 
classes submitted to the NCAA for approval. 6 The final trimes-
ter of high school, Sain completed a third English credit in an 
approved course and accepted a full five-year basketball schol-
arship at Northern Illinois University. 7 Shortly after gradua-
tion, however, the NCAA informed Sain that his "Technical 
Communications" course was not approved by the clearing-
house. The NCAA refused Sain's application for a waiver mak-
ing Sain one-third credit short of meeting the English require-
ments. As a result, Sain lost his scholarship and was unable to 
4. Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 118-19. 
5. !d. at 119. Bowen and the school district deny telling Sain that the course 
would be approved by the NCAA. However, for the purposes of summary judgment, the 
facts are considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. ld. at 119 n. 1. 
6. !d. at 119. 
7. !d. at 119-20. 
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attend college or compete in Division I basketball for the 1996-
s 97 school year. 
Sain sued the school district for negligently failing to sub-
mit the course to the NCAA clearinghouse and for negligent 
misrepresentation by the counselor in providing false informa-
tion about which courses would satisfy the NCAA's require-
ments. The district court held that no cause of action existed as 
a matter of law and dismissed both counts.9 The Iowa Supreme 
Court upheld summary judgment for the defendant school dis-
trict on the negligence claim, so that portion of the case will not 
be discussed in this case note. However, the Iowa Supreme 
Court reversed summary judgment on the negligent misrepre-
sentation claim. 10 It stated: 
The tort of negligent misrepresentation is broad enough to in-
clude a duty for a high school guidance counselor to use rea-
sonable care in providing specific information to a student 
when the guidance counselor has knowledge of the specific 
need for the information and provides the information to the 
student in the course of a counselor-student relationship, and 
a student reasonably relies upon the information under 
circumstances in which the counselor knows or should know 
that the student is relying upon the information. 11 
Ill. EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE CASE HISTORY 
The last educational malpractice case decided by the Iowa 
Supreme Court before Sain was Moore v. Vanderloo. 12 In 
Moore, the Iowa Supreme Court flatly refused to recognize 
three types of educational malpractice claims. The first type of 
educational malpractice claim targets the substance of the cur-
riculum or how it is taught. Under this theory, a claim arises 
when a student alleges that the school failed to teach the stu-
dent basic academic skills thus breaching either a common law 
duty, constitutional provision, or statutory provision. The sec-
ond type of educational malpractice claim arises when a stu-
dent alleges that the school improperly placed the student in, 
removed the student from, or negligently did not place the stu-
8. Id. at 120. 
9. Id. 
10. ld. at 129. 
11. Id. 
12. 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986). 
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dent in a special education program or other program. The 
third type of educational malpractice claim arises when a stu-
dent alleges that the school failed to supervise the student's 
performance. 13 The Moore court stated, "[w]ith the exception of 
one case, the courts in each of these three types of actions have 
unanimously failed to recognize a cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice."14 
The most frequently cited case arising in an educational 
malpractice setting is Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School 
District. 15 Though this case is twenty-five years old, every court 
facing an educational malpractice claim invokes the rationale 
in this case almost superstitiously, as if it were a talisman to 
ward off a storm of calamities that would inevitably descend 
upon the U.S. judicial system if a court were to recognize a 
claim of educational malpractice. 
A. Public Policy Concerns 
There are many legitimate public policy concerns inherent 
in educational malpractice claims. The court in Peter W. identi-
fies the following policy concerns: first, there is no workable 
standard of care against which to judge an educator's conduct. 
Pedagogical techniques vary greatly with no consensus as to 
their respective efficacy. Second, there is no reasonable degree 
of certainty that plaintiff suffered an identifiable or redressible 
injury within the law of negligence. Third, there is no direct 
causal connection between plaintiffs conduct and the injury 
professed. 16 As the court stated, "[s]ubstantial professional au-
thority attests that the achievement of literacy in the schools, 
or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors which affect 
the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching proc-
ess, and beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physi-
13. !d. at 113. 
14. !d. at 114 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (referring to Burger ex rel. M. u. 
Montana, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982)). In Burger, the Montana Supreme Court recog-
nized a cause of action when a school negligently misplaces a student in a special edu-
cation program. The court held that "[t]he school authorities owed the child a duty of 
reasonable care in testing her and placing her in an appropriate special education pro-
gram." Burger, 649 P.2d at 427. However, this remained, until Sain., the only instance 
in which a court failed to grant summary judgment in favor of a defendant school dis-
trict on an educational malpractice type of claim. 
15. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (App. 1st Dist. 1976). 
16. Id. at 861. 
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schools and open the floodgates to future litigation.l8 
In addition to these concerns, other courts have added 
many more. For example, courts fear that recognizing educa-
tional malpractice claims would "force the courts blatantly to 
interfere with the internal operations and daily workings of an 
educational institution."19 Public schools' discretion to imple-
ment new programs or make changes would be limited because 
they would be forced to perpetually monitor whether such deci-
sions might open them to liability. Courts are also afraid that 
recognizing this tort would interpose their judicial judgment 
for that of the legislature who ordinarily defines standards of 
20 
competency. 
Many of the cited cases are relatively old, but the courts' 
fears of these adverse public policy concerns are so severe that 
all cases alleging educational malpractice have been summarily 
dismissed for twenty years. Thus, the major cases from twenty-
five years ago constitute the "last judicial word" on a tort that 
has become a judicial pariah. As one commentator said, "the 
question of whether academic institutions owe a duty to impart 
a minimum level of proficiency has been analyzed by the judi-
ciary as a question of law dependent on public policy considera-
tions,"21 often, it might be added, to the preclusion of any 
analysis as to whether the underlying claim is legitimate, or 
despite the fact that it would be deemed so in any context but 
an educational setting. 
B. Brown v. Compton Unified School District: Same Facts, 
Different Outcome 
In another case with almost the same facts as Sain, these 
public policy concerns were enough to outweigh the claim al-
17. !d. 
18. !d.; see Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982); Moore, 386 
N.W.2d at 114. 
19. Moore, 386 N.W.2d at 115; see Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 
N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979). 
20. Moore, 386 N.W.2d at 115; see Swidryk v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 493 A.2d 
641, 644-45 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 1985). 
21. Timothy Davis, Examining Educational Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a 
Cause of Action be Created for Student-Athletes?, 69 Dcnv. U. L. Rev. 57, 96 (1992). 
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though the court rested its rejection of the claim on statutorily 
conferred immunity for public employees acting within the 
scope of their employment. 22 In Brown v. Compton Unified 
School District, a student sued his high school guidance coun-
selor and school district alleging that he lost his four year bas-
ketball scholarship to USC because of the counselor's negligent 
misrepresentation in advising him to take a particular science 
course which she believed would satisfy the NCAA's require-
ments. USC withdrew Brown's scholarship when it turned out 
that the course did not meet NCAA requirements.23 
The court held that the school had no duty to Brown, and 
thus2 there was no cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-tion. 4 There was no duty despite the fact that it was even 
clearer in this case that there was a special relationship then it 
was in Sain. Compton Unified School District proactively re-
cruited Brown to attend high school and play basketball in its 
district by telling him that Manual Dominguez High School 
would allow him to satisfy the NCAA requirements for athletic 
eligibilit~. Brown relied on that promise in transferring 
schools. 2 Furthermore, unlike Sain, where the school denied 
making a statement that the "technical communications" 
course would meet NCAA requirements,26 in Brown, the princi-
pal of the high school sent a letter to the NCAA requirements 
committee stating that Brown's failure to take one required 
course was "completely the result of misadvisement on the part 
of one of our school's academic counselors."27 
Despite the school's clear admission of guilt, the Brown 
court found that "[p]olicy considerations preclude 'an actionable 
"duty of care" in persons and agencies who administer the aca-
demic phases of the public educational process'."28 Not surpris-
ingly, the court cited the policy rationale in Peter W. v. San 
Francisco Unified School District in declining to recognize 
Brown's claim and stated, "[t]his strong policy consideration 
22. Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172-73. 
23. Id. at 171. 
24. Id. at 172-73. 
25. ld. at 171. 
26. Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 119 n. 1. 
27. Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172. 
28. Id. at 172 (quoting Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861). 
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may outweigh the allegation that Brown undertook a change in 
circumstances in reliance on the school district."29 
The court based its dismissal of the claim on statutory im-
munity, and was thus precluded from making a definitive 
judgment on the identified policy concerns.30 However, it 
seemed clear that the court would have dismissed the claim 
anyway for public policy reasons. 31 On identical facts, the court 
in Sain went through a detailed analysis of the same public 
policy concerns to show that they did not apply to the facts 32 
though the Brown court undoubtedly felt otherwise. 33 
IV. SPECIFIC RATIONALE OF SAIN 
The Sain Court went out of its way to find that considera-
tions of public policy, which had been lethal to every other case 
in the last twenty years except one, did not apply.34 The Sain 
Court distinguished Sain from every other educational mal-
practice case by stating, "[w]e must be careful not to reject all 
claims that arise out of a school environment under the um-
brella of educational malpractice. Instead, the specific facts of 
each case must be considered in light of the relevant policy con-
cerns that drive the rejection of the educational malpractice ac-
tions.":Js If this was the court's way of saying that it was willing 
to distinguish the instant case on its facts, they were the first 
court to consider doing so in twenty years. 
The Sain court identified the five public policy concerns 
listed in Moore v. Vanderloo, and explained why each did not 
apply, or did not apply with equal weight in the Sain case.36 
There was no interference with educational discretion because 
"this case does not challenge classroom methodology or theories 
of education."37 It does not interfere with legislative standards 
of competency, nor is there any fear that an appropriate stan-
dard of care cannot be articulated. The court concluded that it 
29. /d. at 172. 
30. /d. at 173. 
31. See id. at 172. 
32. Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 121-22. 
33. See Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172. 
34. Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 121-22. 
35. /d. at 122 (citation omitted). 
36. /d. at 121-22. 
37. /d. at 122. 
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would be possible to formulate a standard of care because the 
situation is analogous to misrepresentation by professionals. 38 
Sain proves that these public policy considerations do not 
have to be lethal to educational malpractice suits. Public policy 
concerns can be resolved when a duty is imposed by the court 
on the school district. The court considered the other two fac-
tors of the test as well but held that a school district's duty 
could be severely curtailed by putting stringent limitations on 
who can recover. 39 The court thought that severe limitations on 
duty would be sufficient to prevent a flood of ensuing litiga-
tion.40 Clearly, the court intended to severely limit those to 
whom the school had a duty. Perhaps the Sain Court was try-
ing to create a cause of action to be used exclusively by student-
athletes. 
Considering the statements made by the court, it is not a 
stretch for courts to recognize a duty of reasonable care in pre-
venting negligent misrepresentation. Although the court was 
careful to emphasize, more than once, that there can be no duty 
of care in situations falling under the category of educational 
malpractice. 41 However, the court stated that in other circum-
stances "(a] school clearly owes a duty of reasonable care," such 
as maintaining the physical facilities in safe condition or su-
pervising students.42 The court stated that it has recognized the 
tort of negligent misrepresentation in many other circum-
stances such as permitting a party to recover for reasonable re-
liance upon financial statements prepared by an accountant. 43 
It applied the same test that is used for other professionals,44 
which is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
552: 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 125. 
40. See id. 
41. Id. at 122. 
42. Id. 
43. I d. at 123 (citing Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969)). 
44. Id. 
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One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary 
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others 
in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecu-
niary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon 
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or com-
petence in obtaining or communicating the information. 45 
299 
The Iowa Supreme Court decided that the Sain case satis-
fied every requirement of the Restatement's Test. 46 The court 
even applied the requirement that the informabon be supplied 
"for the guidance of others in their business transactions"47 to 
the student/counselor relationship. 4H The dissent objected vig-
orously on this point stating that suggesting course curriculum 
is in no way a "business transaction." 
[T]he majority's logic flies in the face of experience. To accept 
the majority's decision, one must be willing to view the men-
taring relationship between a guidance counselor and a stu-
dent as no different than a business relationship between a 
purveyor of information and a consumer. I disagree with that 
premise. We may live in an information age, but experience 
tells me the sharing of knowledge in school is different than 
the sale of information in the marketplace. 4~1 
In previous cases, the tort of negligent misrepresentation 
had only been recognized in the context of commercial transac-
tions. The court conceded, "no jurisdiction has recognized a tort 
in the context of a school counselor and a student."50 The court 
justified its expansion of the tort by pointing out that neither 
Section 552 nor Iowa case law requires that the case's subject 
matter arise in a commercial or business setting. Gl It only re-
quires that the defendant be a person in the "business of sup-
plying information to others," which the court found applies to 
')2 
a school counselor.' 
45. Restatement !Second) of"Torts ~ 552 ( 1994). 
46. 8ain, 626 N.W.2d at 128. 
47. Restatement (Second) of'Torts ~ 552. 
48. Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 12il. 
49. ld. at 129. 
50. !d. at 12fi. 
51. !d. 
52. !d. at 126. 
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The test the court applied from Section 552 is stringent and 
difficult to satisfy, but the court plunged through it, seemingly 
undaunted by the new territory into which it was expanding 
the tort. The dissent attributes this willingness to impose li-
ability on the court's desire to afford special protection to the 
53 
unique needs of student-athletes. 
V. THE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND STUDENT-ATHLETES 
A. Public Policy Arguments in Support of a Special 
Relationship 
In the last few years, many legal scholars have suggested 
that the unique needs of student-athletes can be met by ex-
panding schools' duty to protect the interests of their student-
athletes. The majority in Sain considered these arguments and 
cited a law review article entitled, Examining Educational 
Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a Cause of Action Be Cre-
ated for Student-Athletes?54 For the purpose of brevity, this 
note will refer to student-athletes by the masculine pronoun 
because most female student-athletes do not experience the 
pressure that male athletes do to focus on athletics to the ne-
glect of academics. To the extent that they do, however, the 
55 
same arguments apply to female athletes. · 
The Davis article urges the imposition of a sp~cial relation-
ship between a university and a student-athlete,"6 but, as the 
Sain Court recognized, the same logic applies to a public high 
school and a student-athlete. The gist of the argument is that a 
college and an athlete are mutually dependent on one another. 
A student-athlete generates substantial revenue for the uni-
versity, and, in return, the athlete depends on the university to 
provide him with an education. 57 Furthermore, in participating 
in school athletics, the student-athlete submits his educational 
autonomy to the direction of the coaches and staff who often 
53. Id. at 130. 
54. Id. at 121 (citing Davis, supra n. 21 at 61). 
55. Sarah E. Gohl, Student Author, A Lesson in English and Gender: Title IX and 
the Male Student-Athlete, 50 Duke L.J. 1123 (2001). 
56. Davis, supra n. 21 at 59. 
57. Id. at 92. 
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discourage certain majors because those majors' time demands 
might conflict with the student-athlete's practice times. 
Coaches and staff may also choose the student-athlete's classes 
for him to help him avoid classes that might be too challeng-
ing. 58 The article suggests that student-athletes "become de-
pendent on agents of their schools to protect their academic in-
terests. "59 The article points out that though the relationship is 
one of mutual dependency, the school is the dominant party, 
and thus acquires a duty to "protect[] the interests of student-
athletes" at least as well as they protect their own. 60 
Though the article specifically addressed the relationship 
between a university and a student-athlete, the same concerns 
apply at the high school level. This is particularly true as 
sports at all levels become more commercialized, and schools 
have more incentive to treat athletes as marketable commodi-
ties rather than just students. 
Court recognition of a special relationship between schools 
and their student-athletes will prevent the type of inequitable 
result that occurred in the Brown case referred to above. In 
Brown, the Compton Unified School District went out of its way 
to recruit Brown to play basketball for their school district, as-
suring him that his new high school would assist him in com-
pleting all of the NCAA eligibility requirements.61 Brown ap-
pears to have fulfilled his end of the agreement in playing 
basketball well enough to win a full-tuition scholarship to USC. 
By its own admission, however, the school breached its end of 
the agreement. The Sain court appeared to be trying to avoid 
this type of inequitable result. 62 
The dissent in Sain recognized the majority opinion's ra-
tionale for what it was: "[i]mplicit in the majority's reasoning is 
the suggestion that, when it comes to NCAA eligibility rules 
and athletic scholarships, business is the name of the game."63 
Seen in this light, it does not seem as though referring to a 
guidance counselor advising a student- athlete as guiding oth-
ers in their business transactions is such a stretch. Perhaps the 
58. Id. at 93. 
59. ld. 
60. Id. at 94. 
61. Brown, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-72. 
62. ld. at 172. 
63. Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 130. 
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Sain majority was simply enlightened enough to recognize a 
business dealing when they saw it. 
B. Recognizing a Special Relationship in Other Student-Athlete 
Contexts 
So far, this note has explored the potential for the exploita-
tion of student-athletes in only one context, but the wisdom of 
the Sain court becomes more apparent in exploring other con-
texts in which the potential for student-athlete exploitation is 
high. The most famous student-athlete case is Ross v. Creigh-
ton University. 64 Creighton University recruited high school 
basketball star Kevin Ross and offered him a scholarship de-
spite the fact that they knew it would be almost impossible for 
him to succeed academically at the university. In 1978, the av-
erage student registering at Creighton had received 23.2 points 
out of a possible 36 on the American College Placement Test 
(ACT). Ross, on the other hand, had received a 9. With great ef-
fort, the coaching staff kept him eligible for the basketball team 
for four years by enrolling him in classes such as ceramics, 
marksmanship, and the respective theories of basketball, track 
and field, and football. Such haphazard class selection was 
against University rules, but the school made a special excep-
tion to keep Ross eligible.(j5 Ross claimed that the school con-
tributed to his academic failure by "failing to provide 'adequate 
and competent tutoring services"' and "failing 'to afford the 
plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to take full advantage of tu-
toring sessions'."66 Finally, the school enrolled him in remedial 
courses at a local private elementary school and high school, 
but it was too little too late. At the end of his eligibility, Ross 
had no degree, carried a D average, and had the reading skills 
of a seventh-grader and language skills of a fourth-grader. 67 
The district court dismissed Ross's ensuing lawsuit against 
Creighton University by stating, "educational malEractice has 
been repeatedly rejected by the American courts." 8 The court 
64. 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990), reu'd in part and afl'd in part, 957 F.2d 410 
(7th Cir. 1992); see Johnny C. Parker, Educational Malpractice: A Tort is Born, ;39 Clev. 
St. L. Rev. 301, 303-05 (1991). 
65. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322. 
66. Id. at 1331. 
67. Id. at 1322. 
68. Id. at 1327. 
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cited the usual public policy concerns as its rationale: difficulty 
of determining proximate cause, lack of dut~, and the possibil-
ity of triggering large amounts oflitigation. 6 
Applying the rationale in the Davis article, the school would 
be liable if the court found that the school did not "give at least 
as much attention to protecting the interests of student-
athletes as to protecting their own [interest]."70 Ross and 
Creighton were clearly mutually dependant on each other. 
Ross, as a prominent local basketball player, helped generate 
considerable revenue for Creighton University by helping the 
basketball team's overall success and by attracting fans to 
watch his performance. As the dominant party in the relation-
ship, the university had a special duty to protect Ross's inter-
ests, which they neglected or intentionally breached by mis-
leading him and causing him to believe that if he matriculated 
at Creighton, he would succeed academically. The university 
also neglected his interests by persuading him to take "soft" 
courses in order to maintain his eligibility, rather than encour-
aging him to take courses that are useful in obtaining a degree. 
Under this analysis, as the dominant party exercising control 
over Ross's academic decisions, the university assumed a spe-
cial obligation to protect his interests at least as well as they 
protected their own interest and should be liable for failing to 
do so. 
In a similar case, Jones v. Williams, 71 a student-athlete 
claimed that an Idaho Junior College and the Detroit Board of 
Education "academically carried" him in order to keep him eli-
gible for basketball, despite the fact that he could neither read 
nor write. 72 Jones claimed that peer ridicule because of his illit-
eracy caused him a nervous breakdown. 73 
The schools treated the students in both these cases differ-
ently because they were gifted athletes. Instead of holding 
them to the same standard as regular students or helping them 
improve their skills so that they could achieve that standard, 
the schools exploited their athletic prowess for the school's eco-
nomic gain until the student-athlete's eligibility expired. Upon 
completion of their athletic eligibility, the schools left them to 
69. !d. at 1328-29. 
70. Davis, supra n. 21 at 94. 
71. 431 N.W.2d 419 (Mich. App. 1988). 
72. !d. at 422. 
73. !d. 
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fend for themselves with the sub-par skills they had acquired. 
Davis characterizes the relationship between a student-athlete 
and a university as "institutionalized powerlessness."74 Per-
haps judicial intervention is necessary to correct this imbalance 
and the resulting abuse of superior power. 75 
In her article, "A Lesson in English and Gender: Title IX 
and the Male Student-Athlete," Sarah Gohl adds to the argu-
ment that student-athletes require special protections in order 
to prevent their exploitation. 76 She argues that athletically tal-
ented males are socialized to believe that sacrificing their focus 
on academics to focus on sports is a fair trade-off. 77 Young male 
athletes are socialized to believe that they will not need a good 
education to succeed but instead will receive generous compen-
sation for their athletic skills as a professional athlete. 78 Iowa 
State football coach Jim Walden stated that, "[n]ot more than 
20 percent of the football players go to college for an educa-
tion."79 Most college athletes are there because they are hoping 
to turn pro. They do not object when the coaching staff sched-
ules practices during scheduled study or tutoring times, as in 
Jackson v. Drake University, 80 or when tutors complete the ath-
letes' term papers, as occurred at the University ofTennessee. 81 
They do not object because they plan to turn pro and will have 
no use for an education. 
Universities feed these notions by encouraging student-
athletes to spend more time improving their athletic prowess 
than studying because student-athletes have become powerful 
revenue-generating machines. What these students do not real-
ize is that out of 50,000 NCAA football players and 13,000 
NCAA male basketball players, only 310 per year make it to 
the NFL and 50 a year are drafted into the NBA. This is a 3.3% 
chance and a 1.9% chance, respectively. 82 
74. Davis, supra n. 21 at 94. 
75. !d. 
76. Gohl, supra n. 55 at 1126. 
77. !d. at 1126-27. 
7R. !d. at 1132-43. 
79. /d. at 1134 (quoting Andrew Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism 
and Conflict in Big-Time College Sports :19 (Princeton U. Press l~l9fl)). 
80. 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1492 (S.D. Iowa 1991). 
81. Gohl, supra n. 55 at 11~ l. 
82. /d. ai U:H. 
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Under the current system, universities have no duty and 
thus no incentive to protect any academic interest of their stu-
dent-athletes. Because they have no duty, most schools are not 
concerned with seeing that their student-athletes graduate or 
leave their universities equipped with skills to help them suc-
ceed in their post-university lives. While universities certainly 
cannot be held liable if a student does not succeed, they can 
and should be liable if they actively contribute to the student's 
failure and prevent their success in order to further their own 
interests. For this reason, it can be argued that courts should 
create a special relationship between schools and their student-
athletes in order to protect student-athletes from exploitation. 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A SPECIAL 
STUDENT-ATHLETE/SCHOOL RELATIONSHIP 
The source of the problem between student athletes and the 
schools they attend is that the legislative branch has been un-
responsive to the needs of student-athletes. The argument for a 
special relationship between student-athletes and their school 
would be bolstered if there was a constitutional basis for recog-
nizing a special relationship in the student-athlete/school rela-
tionship. So far, however, student-athletes have been unable to 
obtain redress when they are unfairly forced by academic insti-
tutions to choose between involvement in athletics and the op-
portunity to obtain a sound education. The nature of the injury 
lends itself to a Fourteenth Amendment argument: that they 
have either been denied due process, or that they are being de-
nied equal protection of the laws, student-athletes could pro-
vide a compelling reason for courts to intervene on their behalf. 
This note will describe a hypothetical due process claim for 
purposes of illustration. 
Student-athletes could argue that the courts' perpetual de-
nial of their educational malpractice claims is a violation of due 
process. Student athletes have been denied due process of law 
because of their lack of political power compared to the politi-
cally powerful educational institutions. This inherent imbal-
ance between student-athletes and education institutions 
means that, without judicial intervention, student athletes' 
rights cannot be adequately protected. 
Well established case law provides for judicial intervention 
when legislation fails to adequately protect the constitutional 
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rights of an underrepresented group. Footnote four of United 
States v. Carolene Products8a has been used to strike down leg-
islation that is detrimental to "discrete and insular minorities," 
or that "tends seriously to curtail the operation of those politi-
cal processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties."84 However, the representation-reinforcement rationale of 
footnote four can also be invoked to provide a liberal interpre-
tation of existing legislation when the legislative branch fails to 
adequately protect the interests of an under-represented mi-
nority through existing legislation. 
It cannot be argued that existing legislation adequately 
protects student-athletes. The only attempt Congress has made 
to protect the interests of student-athletes is through Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provides that 
"[no] person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance."85 This statute is 
commonly thought of as providing equal opportunities for fe-
male athletes, but it also protects any student-athlete from be-
ing denied equal access to educational opportunities. 
Courts have considered Title IX much too vague, however, 
to provide a cause of action for student-athletes who are denied 
equal access to educational opportunities. Neither the legisla-
ture, nor the judiciary through interpretation of Title IX has 
ever provided enhanced protection to student-athletes on the 
basis of Title IX. Indeed, as Kevin Ross and many other stu-
dent-athletes have found, they have no recourse, even when 
they are the victims of what would be actionable negligence or 
deliberate mistreatment in any context except a student-school 
context. The kind of outrageous treatment received by student-
athletes would never be tolerated in any other context. 
Under the representation-reinforcement schema, a student-
athlete would be able to say that they are being denied due 
process because neither Title IX nor judicial interpretation of 
Title IX affords them any protection from actionable negligence 
by their schools. Student-athletes, in their "institutional power-
lessness" could be considered a discrete and insular minority, 
83. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
84. !d. at 153 n. 4. 
85. 20 U.S.C. ~ 1681(a) (2000). 
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which cannot remedy its own situation through the political 
process because of its relative political powerlessness. Though 
students are not blocked by any statutory impediment from 
participating in the political process, students as a whole do 
not have the financial resources nor the political experience to 
be able to effectively lobby for political change. There are no 
student-athletes in Congress and unlike educators, there is no 
interest group organized specifically to protect their interests. 
On the other hand, The National Education Association 
(NEA) has 2.6 million members and is the largest union in the 
United States and one of the most powerful lobbies in Wash-
ington. 86 One political writer noted of the NEA's political 
power, "[t]his kind of clout makes it a political kingmaker."87 
During the 2000 Democratic National Convention, one in 
twelve delegates was a member of the NEA. The total number 
of NEA delegates, 350, was larger than the entire delegation 
from the state of California. 88 Educational institutions and pub-
lic schools have both the financial and political resources to ef-
fectively block legislation in many jurisdictions that would 
abolish their governmental immunity to suit or be otherwise 
detrimental to their interests. If it were not so, we would not 
have seen unprecedented expansion in all areas of tort liability 
in the last thirty years while in the area of educational liability 
alone, there has been no expanded liability. Indeed, the tort of 
educational malpractice has been all but dead. This is because 
educational institutions and public schools are one of the most 
effective and politically powerful lobbies in the United States. 
Public schools and universities are so powerful that their 
political clout has been sufficient to prevent any recognition of 
the tort of educational malpractice. At the same time, liability 
has expanded greatly in other areas of tort law despite the ex-
istence of many of the same impediments that have completely 
prevented expanded liability in education. Under the common 
law, school districts and educational institutions were not li-
able for injuries resulting from their negligence. 89 Similarly, 
under the common law, a plaintiff could not recover for the 
R6 .• Joel Mowbray, The NEA's Political Machine: New Evidence Indicates Misuse 
of Tax-Exempt Dues 1 
<http://wv.'W .capital research .org/pub I ications/lahor watch/lwO 111. pdf> (Nov. 200 1). 
R7. ld. 
Ril. ld. 
R~. Parker, supra n. ()4, at :Jl :l. 
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common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(liED). As late as 1934, there was no protectable interest in 
mental and emotional stability.90 Since then, however, the tort 
has become recognized and even included in the Restatement of 
Torts. 
Courts didn't recognize liED for many of the same policy 
reasons they don't recognize educational malpractice: proxi-
mate cause and lack of judicial remedy. 91 The courts have re-
solved their policy concerns sufficiently to recognize a cause of 
action for liED, but the courts still claim that the policy issues 
implicated in proximate cause and lack of judicial remedy are 
unresolvable for the purpose of educational malpractice litiga-
tion. 
These courts' claims may not be accurate though. The New 
York Court of Appeals in Donohue u. Copiague Union Free 
School District, while refusing to uphold the cause of action, 
recognized that J.?roximate cause was not an impenetrable bar-
rier to recovery. "The ... court found that, despite the obvious 
difficulties, a plaintiff might indeed be able to demonstrate that 
defendant caused his or her injury. It also noted that an appli-
cable standard of care might be found."9:3 
Although these same policy issues have been successfully 
resolved in medical malpractice and other professional mal-
practice cases, the combined force of policy concerns and politi-
cal clout have allowed educational institutions to escape liabil-
ity in similar contexts. This inequity is certainly beyond the 
political power of student-athletes to remedy. An effective rem-
edy for student-athletes would require a court that is motivated 
by a representation-reinforcement framework to intervene on 
student-athletes' behalves. 
Title IX may be the answer that student-athletes have been 
looking for. A liberal interpretation of Title IX would give a 
cause of action to student-athletes who were unfairly denied an 
opportunity to obtain an education by the institution for which 
they competed athletically. 94 
90. ld. at 312. 
91. !d. at 311-12. 
92. 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54. 
98. John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims: A Repre-
sentational Focus, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 349, 359 (1992). 
94. See Gohl, supra n. 55, at 1125. 
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In enacting Title IX, Congress was silent as to whether a 
private right of action exists when a student-athlete is denied 
equal access to educational opportunities; however, the court 
may still imply such a cause of action from the statutory lan-
guage. Courts make implications all of the time. Arguably, the 
most important private right of action in securities law has 
been implied from a statute that is as vague as Title IX. 95 Be-
cause courts saw a pressing need to protect investors, Rule 10b-
5 of the Securities Act of 1933 has been interpreted to prohibit 
material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted that Rule 10b-5 is now "a judicial oak which has grown 
from little more than a legislative acorn."96 
If the judiciary were to infer a cause of action from Title IX, 
universities would be forced to shift their emphasis from ath-
letics to academics or face the risk of liability. Thus, schools 
would have an incentive to invest more of their time and re-
sources towards ensuring that student-athletes are both quali-
fied to attend the school and that they receive quality educa-
tions. At the very least, schools would be compelled not to 
misrepresent the likelihood of the student-athlete being aca-
demically successful. Universities would no longer be able to do 
things that prevent the academic success of their student-
athletes, such as scheduling practices during study times or 
choosing "soft" classes to maintain the student-athlete's eligi-
bility. 
VII. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO EXPANDED LIABILITY 
In order to infer a cause of action for student-athletes from 
Title IX, several problems must be overcome. The vagueness of 
Title IX would need to be clarified by providing courts a stan-
dard of review to determine what constitutes actionable negli-
gence by a university. As demonstrated by other courts, setting 
a standard of review that clarifies Title IX would be difficult 
but not impossible.97 Second, courts would need a compelling 
reason to intervene. Courts would be unlikely to intervene 
95. See William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Business 
Associations: Cases and Materials on Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations, 426-27 
(4th ed., Found. Press 2000). 
96. Blue Chip StampH v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
97. See Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54. 
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unless motivated by a constitutional mandate to correct a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation. Third, courts will be reluc-
tant to recognize a special relationship between educational in-
stitutions and student-athletes because it may be difficult to 
limit such a duty to student-athletes. Recovery for educational 
malpractice liability under an inferred Title IX cause of action 
would be limited, by definition, to student-athletes. 
Of course, the latter issue would not limit liability under 
the rationale used by the Sain court. Whether schools will be-
come liable to the general student population was a major con-
cern to the dissent in Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community School 
District: 
Implicit in the majority's reasoning is the suggestion that, 
when it comes to NCAA eligibility rules and athletic scholar-
ships, business is the name of the game. But, the cause of ac-
tion we recognize today will not be limited to athletes. It will 
apply to all students, whether talented in music or debate or 
academics."98 
It is true that it would be difficult to limit the scope of the 
special duty of a school to a student-athlete if such a duty is 
created based on the rationale used in Sain. The problem is 
that Sain creates liability for schools without establishing lim-
its as to whom the school will be liable to. Iowa, in deciding 
Sain, was the first jurisdiction to recognize a cause of action for 
negligent misrepresentation by a school counselor to a student. 
There is no reason that this liability should or could be limited 
to allowing student-athletes to recover,99 yet this is a risk the 
court appears to recognize and accept. 
The risk of exposing schools to educatlonal malpractice 
suits brought by all types of students will likely prevent most 
other jurisdictions from following Iowa's precedent. For this 
reason, it seems unlikely that the Sain case will set an imme-
diate precedent for imposition of large-scale liability to all stu-
dents. 
The Constitution of the United States does not guarantee 
the right to education. Although many state constitutions 
guarantee the right to obtain an education, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has said that there is no right to education mandated by 
98. 626 N.W. 2d at 130. 
99. /d. at 125-129. 
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the U.S. Constitution. 100 Indeed, the Supreme Court said, 
"[e]ducation ... is not among the rights afforded explicit pro-
tection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any ba-
sis for saying it is implicitly so protected."101 The Supreme 
Court's position provides one of the reasons why courts have re-
lentlessly rejected educational malpractice claims. It is note-
worthy that Rodriguez, like Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified 
School District, 102 and other flagship cases cited to justify re-
fusal to consider educational malpractice claims, is thirty years 
old. If the Supreme Court were to reexamine this issue, it 
might decide differently. However, as the case law currently 
stands, there is no general constitutional right to a public edu-
cation. 
For these reasons, potential plaintiffs would have to over-
come some substantial objections to achieve a general judicial 
recognition of the tort of educational malpractice. Many of 
these objections have taken on the status of nearly irrefutable 
dogma, such as the policy concerns the court listed in Peter W. 
It is very doubtful that Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community 
School District will have this kind of overwhelming effect. 
However, it is possible, based on precedent in Sain, to convince 
courts to carve out an exception for student athletes if courts 
can find a way to limit a school's duty to protect from expand-
ing to include all students. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to know how Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community 
School District will affect the relationship between student-
athletes and educational institutions in other jurisdictions. 103 
The Iowa Supreme Court may receive nothing but derision 
from its judicial peers, or this case may begin a new and novel 
chapter in educational malpractice history: one in which 
schools become liable for their torts, at least in the limited con-
text of student-athlete exploitation. 
The Sain court went out of its way to hold that the Cedar 
Rapids Community School District could be liable for negligent 
100. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
101. ld. 
102. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854. 
103. 626 N.W.2d 115. 
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misrepresentation. The court held this way despite the fact 
that a school district had never before been liable for the negli-
gent misrepresentations of its guidance counselor to stu-
dents. 104 Strong public policy arguments have prevented school 
liability in the past. However, it may be that in balancing those 
fears with the danger of allowing public schools and universi-
ties to exploit their student-athletes with impunity, the courts 
have discovered a countervailing interest of equal magnitude. 
The Sain court probably found the school liable because it rec-
ognized that in this time of increasing commercialization of 
athletic competition at all levels, student-athletes will become 
increasingly exploited unless courts intervene. The court was 
trying to create an incentive for schools to put a heavier em-
phasis on the "student" aspect of their responsibilities to 
counter the emphasis society is increasingly placing on the 
"athlete" portion. 
Patricia Abbott 
104. !d. at 125. 
